

25X1 E C R E T 080400Z APR 72 CITE SCSAIGON 250

TXXT

25X1 REF: [REDACTED]

1. THE TROUBLE WE HAVE WITH REF AND WITH ANY NUMBER OF RECENT PLANNING PAPERS IS THAT THEY TEND TO ASSUME THAT END OF U.S. GROUND COMBAT OPERATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM CAN BE EQUATED WITH END OF U.S. INTEREST IN SURVIVAL OF AN INDEPENDENT NON-COMMUNIST SOUTH VIE COR THAT NORTH VIETNAM WILL SOMEHOW MODIFY ITS POLICIES SO AS TO MINIMIZE NEED FOR CONTINUING U.S. SUPPORT.

2. WHILE IT IS ENTIRELY POSSIBLE THAT HEADQUARTERS MAY HAVE INFO BEARING ON U.S. AND SOVIET POLICIES NOW AVAILABLE HERE--AND WE SUBMIT THAT NORTH VIETNAM ABILITY TO WAGE WAR IN SOUTH VIETNAM DIRECTLY RELATED TO SOVIET POLICY--FROM HERE IT LOOKS AS IF WE NOWHERE NEAR THE END OF THE TUNNEL. WHILE LEVEL OF MILITARY ACTIVITY WILL VARY FROM HIGH POINTS TO RELATIVE LULLS ONLY TO GO BACK UP AGAIN, THIS PERHAPS NOT AS IMPORTANT QUESTION FOR PLANNING PURPOSES AS THE FOLLOWING:

[REDACTED]

PAGE 2 SCSAIGON 250 S E C R E T

A. WILL U.S. MAINTAIN CONTINUING INTEREST IN
EXISTENCE OF AN INDEPENDENT NON-COMMUNIST SOUTH VIETNAM;

B. WHAT PRICE THIS AND NEXT ADMINISTRATION PREPARED
TO PAY TO MAINTAIN SUCH EQUITY IN TERMS OF RESOURCES
AND POLICIES (ASSUMING OF COURSE THAT THERE WILL NOT
BE UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES NEW U.S. GROUND FORCE

25X1 INVOLVEMENT) AND

C. WHAT INTELLIGENCE EFFORT- [REDACTED]

25X1

[REDACTED] WILL BE NECESSARY AND CAN BE
GENERATED TO MEET REQUIREMENT OF GVN AND OF U.S. GOVERNMENT,
IN TERMS OF LATTER'S CONTINUING INTERESTS. (OBVIOUSLY
THE LESSER THE INTEREST, THE LESS INTELLIGENCE WE NEED.)

25X1 3. STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT USIB ADDRESS ITSELF TO ABTSE
BECAUSE ONCE THESE DETERMINATIONS MADE IT SHOULD BE COMPARATIVELY
EASY TO DECIDE [REDACTED]

25X1

[REDACTED] IN ABSENCE OF POLICY DETERMINATION IT
DOES SEEM TO US, HOWEVER, THAT WE ARE NICKELING AND DIMING
OURSELVES TO DEATH WITHOUT REFERENCE TO LONG TERM OBJECTIVES.

25X1 4. RELATED TO THE ABOVE, GT NOT CLEAR TO US TO WHAT
FITENT THE U.S. IS WILLING TO PROVIDE FINISHED INTEL PRODUCT

25X1 5. AS CURRENT OFFENSIVE ONCE AGAIN SHOWS, AS LONG AS
NORTH VIETNAM CAN MOVE FROM SANCTUARY POSITION, AIR POWER
[REDACTED] IS ONLY EFFECTIVE MEANS OF INTERDICTION.
VIETNAMIZATION ON GROUND AND EVEN IN AIR BOUND TO BE INEFFECTIVE

[REDACTED]

WITHOUT EXTENSIVE COMINT SUPPORT FOR TARGETING.

6. WE CANNOT BELIEVE THAT EITHER THIS OR EVEN THE NEXT
U.S. ADMINISTRATION WILL ABANDON SOUTH VIETNAM. THEREFORE
RECOMMEND THAT COMINT PLANUING BE ALIGNED WITH MAINTENANCE
OF POLICY INTERESTS WHICH WILL CONTINUE BEYOND TROOP PRESENCE.

[REDACTED]